includes the nature of language, of meaning, and of mind. Hence the notion of a concept cannot be explicated without at the same time sketching the background against which it is set, and the 'correctness' of a particular notion of concept cannot be evaluated without at the same time evaluating the world-view in which it plays a role.
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attempt to characterize the mental resources that make possible the articulation of humans' knowledge and experience of the world.
E-concepts and I-Concepts
There is a fundamental tension in the ordinary language term concept. On one hand, it is something out there in the world: 'the Newtonian concept of mass' is something that is spoken of as though i t exists independently of who actually knows or grasps it. Likewise, 'grasping a concept' evokes comparison to grasping a physical object, except that one somehow does it with one's mind instead of one's hand. On the other hand, a concept is spoken of as an entity within one's head, a private entity, a product of the imagination that can be conveyed to others only by means of language, gesture, drawing, or some other imperfect means of communication.
Precisely the same tension has been discussed by Chomsky 1986 with respect to the term language. He differentiates the two poles as 'E-language'
(external language, the language seen as external artifact) versus 'I-language' (internal language, the language as a body of internally encoded information). I will adopt Chomsky's terminology and speak of E-concepts versus I-concepts. For Chomsky's purpose-the characterization of the mental resources that make possible human knowledge of language-the notion of I-language rather than E-language is the appropriate focus of inquiry. Chomsky argues this point at length in Chomsky 1986 , and he has in fact been quite explicit about it at least since Chomsky 1965. The new terminology only helps make clearer an old and forceful position.
However, the choice of I-language as the focus of Chomsky's linguistic theory does not rest on a priori argumentation alone. It rests primarily on the suitability of this notion to support scientific investigation into the issues that flow from the overarching goals of the inquiry. To the extent that generative linguistics has indeed been successful in increasing our understanding of the human language capacity, the choice of I-language as the object of inquiry has been vindicated. (And notice that disagreement-even violent disagreement-among its practitioners does not diminish the fact that progress has been made. It stands to reason that, at any particular moment, the most time and energy is being spent at the frontiers of understanding, not in the areas that have been settled. As any linguist will acknowledge, these frontiers have expanded considerably over the past three decades.)
My purposc-the characterization of the mental resources that make possible human knowledge and experience of the world-is conceived as an extension of Chomsky's goals. Accordingly, an important boundary condition on my enterprise is that it be in all respects compatible with the world-view of generative linguistics.
In particular, if we think very roughly of language as a vehicle for expressing concepts, an integrated theory of language and the mind must include a way for linguistic expressions to be related to concepts. If, for my purposes and Chomsky's, the notion of I-language rather than Elanguage is the suitable focus of inquiry, then on the face of it one should also choose I-concepts rather than E-concepts as the focus for a compatible theory of knowledge. In this paper I hope to accomplish two things. First, I will ground a theory of I-concepts called Conceptual Semantics in first principles parallel to those of generative syntax and phonology, and show how other approaches are incompatible with this outlook. Second, since I have stressed that a world-view is evaluated by how well it suits one's purposes, I will demonstrate some actual empirical results that flow from adopting my approach. (Most of the arguments are elaborated in much greater detail in Jackendoff 1983 Jackendoff , 1987 
First Principles of Conceptual Knowledge
The fundamental motivation behind generative syntax is of course the creativity of language-the fact that a speaker of a language can understand and create an indefinitely large number of sentences that he or she has never heard before. It follows from this observation that a speaker's repertoire of syntactic structures cannot be characterized just as a finite list of sentences. Nor, of course, can it be characterized as an infinite set of possible sentences of the language, because it must be instantiated in a finite (albeit large) brain. Rather, one's potential repertoire of syntactic structures must be mentally encoded in terms of a finite set of primitives and a finite set of principles of combination that collectively describe (or generate) the class of possible sentences. In speaking or understanding a sentence, then, a language user is taken to be creating or invoking a mental information structure, the syntactic structure of the sentence, which is organized in conformance with the principles of syntactic structure.
Parallel arguments obtain for conceptual knowledge, in two different ways. First, a language user presumably is not gratuitously producing and parsing syntactic structures for their own sake: a syntactic structure expresses a concept. On the basis of this concept, the language user can perform any number of tasks, for instance checking the sentence's consistency with other linguistic or extralinguistic knowledge, performing inferences, formulating a response, or translating the sentence into another language. Corresponding to the indefinitely large variety of syntactic structures, then, there must be an indefinitely large variety of concepts that can be invoked in the production and comprehension of sentences. It follows that the repertoire of concepts expressible by sentences cannot be mentally encoded as a list, but must be characterized in terms of a finite set of mental primitives and a finite set of principles of mental combination that collectively describe the set of possible concepts expressed by sentences.
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71 For convenience, I will refer to these two sets together as the 'grammar of sentential concepts'.
It is widely assumed, and I will take for granted, that the basic units out of which a sentential concept is constructed are the concepts expressed by the words in the sentence, that is, lexical concepts. It is easy to see that lexical concepts too are subject to the argument from creativity. For instance, consider the concept expressed by the word dog. Someone who knows this concept, upon encountering an indefinitely large variety of objects, will be able to judge whether they are dogs or not. Thus the concept cannot be encoded as a list of the dogs one has previously encountered; nor, because the brain is finite, can it be a list of all dogs there ever have been and will be, or of all possible dogs. Rather, it must be some sort of finite schema that can be compared with the mental representations of arbitrary new objects to produce a judgment of conformance or nonconformance.
Two immediate qualifications. First, there may well be objects for which people's judgments disagree. This does not entail that there is no concept dog or that people do not know the meaning of the word. Rather, since our concern is with people's internalized schemas, we simply conclude that people may have schemas for dog that differ in various details, and that these differences too may bear examination.
Second, there may be novel objects such that one cannot judge clearly whether they are dogs or not. ('It's sort of a dog and sort of a wolf.') Again this does not necessarily challenge the idea that one has an internalized schema. Rather, from such examples we may conclude that there is a potential degree of indeterminacy either in the lexical concept itself, or in the procedure for comparing i t with mental representations of novel objects, or in both. Such indeterminacies are in fact rampant in lexical concepts; section 7 will discuss some characteristics of conceptual knowlege that give rise to them.
To sum up so far: paralleling the argument from syntactic creativity to the necessity for principles or rules in syntactic knowledge, we have argued (1) that sentential concepts cannot be listed, but must be mentally generated on the basis of a finite set of primitives and principles of combination; (2) that lexical concepts cannot consist of a list of instances, but must consist of finite schemas that can be creatively compared (i.e. in rule-governed fashion) to novel inputs.
The second major issue in the foundation of syntactic theory flows from the problem of acquisition: how can a child acquire the rules of syntax on the basis of the fragmentary evidence available? In particular, how does the child induce rides from instances of well-formed sentences? This question is rendered especially pointed by the fact that the community of generative linguists, with all their collective intelligence, have not been able to fully determine the syntactic rules of English in over thirty years of research, supported by many centuries of traditional grammatical description; yet of course every normal child exposed to English masters the grammar by the age of ten or so. This apparent paradox of language acquisition motivates the central hypothesis of generative linguistics: that the child comes to the task of language learning equipped with an innate Universal Grammar that narrowly restricts the options available for the grammar he or she is trying to acquire. The driving issue in generative linguistics, then, is to determine the form of Universal Grammar, consonant both with the variety of human languages and also with their learnability.
The parallel argument can be made for the logical problem of concept acquisition, in both the sentential and lexical domains. For the former case, consider that the language learner must acquire not only the principles for constructing syntactically well-formed sentences, but also the principles for constructing the corresponding sentential concepts. Like the rules of syntax, these principles must be acquired on the basis of some combination of linguistic experience, nonlinguistic experience, and innate constraints on possible principles. As in syntax, then, an important part of our task is to determine what aspects of the grammar of sentential concepts are learned and what aspects are innate; the innate parts must be sufficiently rich to make it possible to acquire the rest.
Turning to lexical concepts, consider that one is capable of acquiring during one's life an indefinitely large number of concepts, each of them on the basis of rather fragmentary evidence. (What evidence might be involved in learning the concepts expressed by such words as bevel, prosaic, phonology, justice, or belief?) Again, since lexical concepts must be encoded as unconscious schemas rather than lists of instances (and in the case of the words above it is not even clear what could be presented as instances), lexical concept acquisition too presents a problem parallel to the acquisition of syntax. As in syntax, we adopt the hypothesis that one's stock of lexical concepts is constructed from an innate basis of possible concepts, modulated by the contribution of linguistic and nonlinguistic experience.
But now the argument from creativity applies in a new way. If there is an indefinitely large stock of possible lexical concepts, and the innate basis for acquiring them must be encoded in a finite brain, we are forced to conclude that the innate basis must consist of a set of generative principles-a group of primitives and principles of combination that collectively determine the set of lexical concepts. This implies in turn that most if not all lexical concepts are composite, that is, that they can be decomposed in terms of the primitives and principles of combination of the innate 'grammar of lexical concepts'. Learning a lexical concept, then, is to be thought of as constructing a composite expression within the grammar of lexical concepts, associating it with phonological and syntactic structures, and storing them together in long-term memory as a usable unit. (This contrasts sharply with Jerry Fodor's view that lexical concepts are cognitively primitive monads linked with each other by meaning postulates. Section 8 compares the two positions.)
Given the parallelism in first principles, I therefore believe that the
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73 central issue of the theory of conceptual knowledge ought to parallel that of the theory of syntax: What are the innate units and principles of organization that make human lexical and sentential concepts both possible in all their variety and also learnable on the basis of some realistic combination of linguistic and nonlinguistic experience?
Three Models for the Description of Meaning
The preceding section has used the expression 'concept' operationally to mean essentially 'a mental representation that can serve as the meaning of a linguistic expression'. In the present framework, then, the act of understanding a sentence S-recovering its meaning-is to be regarded as placing S in correspondence with a concept C, which has internal structure derivable from the syntactic structure and lexical items of S. The idea that a meaning is a sort of mental representation is, of course, not universally accepted. Perhaps the most prestigious tradition in the study of meaning grows out of Frege's 'Sense and Reference' 1892, where he very carefully disassociates the 'sense' of an expression-what he takes to be an objective, publicly available entity-from the 'idea' that a user of the expression carries in his head, which is subjective and variable. Frege's notion of 'sense' underpins the approach to meaning in model-theoretic semantics. This is seen clearly, for instance, in the following quote from David Lewis's foundational paper 'General Semantics'. I distinguish two topics: first, the description of possible languages or grammars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associated with aspects of the world; and second, the description of the psychological and sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract semantic systems is the one used by a person or population. Only confusion comes of mixing these two topics. This paper deals almost entirely with the first. (Lewis 1972, p.170) It is hard to find a clearer statement that the purposes of model-theoretic semantics are different from those of generative linguistics, and that their wodd-views are incompatible. To be sure, both generative grammar and model-theoretic semantics treat language as a formal system. But they differ radically in the goals they wish to accomplish through such treatment. The
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Mind G. Language avowed purpose of model-theoretic semantics is to explicate Truth, a relation between language and reality, independent of language users. In turn, the truth-conditions of sentences can be treated as speaker-independent only if both reality and the language that describes it are speakerindependent as well. Hence a truth-conditional semantics in the Tarskian or Davidsonian sense requires a theory of E-language, of language as an abstract artifact extrinsic to speakers.
As stressed in section 2, the purpose of generative grammar has always been to explicate I-language, the principles internalized by speakers that constitute knowledge of a language. A typical statement of generative linguistic theory, say 'Sentence S is grammatical in Language L because of Principle P', is taken to be shorthand for a psychological claim, roughly 'A speaker of Language L treats Sentence S as grammatical because his knowledge of Language L includes Principle I", subject to the usual caveats about attentional and processing limitations. A compatible theory of meaning must therefore concern the principles internalized in the speaker that permit him or her to understand sentences, draw inferences from them, and judge their truth: it must be a theory of I-semantics, not E-semantics. Within a theory of I-semantics, a statement in the Tarskian vein like 'Sentence S in Language L is true if and only if condition C is met' is taken as shorthand for something like 'A speaker of Language L treats Sentence S as true if and only if his construal (or mental representation) of the world meets condition C', and it is subject to similar caveats about attentional and processing limitations. This is the basis of the approach of Conceptual Semantics, in which a level of mental representation called conceptual structure is seen as the form in which speakers encode their construal of the world.
It is sometimes proposed that there is no inherent conflict between the two approaches to semantics. One is about the way the world is, and the other is about the way we grasp the world. They might lead to altogether different insights-hopefully complementary ones. I see nothing wrong with this conclusion in principle: you go your way, I'll go mine. The difficulty is one of terminological imperialism, as exemplified by Lewis's 1972 widely quoted slogan to the effect that the study of 'Menta1ese'-in effect I-semantics-isn't really semantics. Similar difficulties arise in the Introduction to the Forum, in which the philosopher asserts that the study of concepts has nothing to do with psychology. Along with this goes the implication that what the I-semanticist and the psychologist are doing isn't really anything worth doing. As I have stressed in section 1, whether it's worth doing cannot be determined until the results are in; as promised, I will present some. I don't care what you call the enterprise; but notice for example that relativistic physics is treated as a way of doing physics, not some curious non-enterprise, and it legitimately took over most of the basic terminology of Newtonian physics despite a radical conceptual restructuring. Such, I suggest, is the case in the contrast of E-semantics and I-semantics. Unlike the model theorists, he is committed to a combinatorial mental representation in terms of which language users make inferences and formulate responses. Moreover, Fodor stresses that the performance of these tasks must be explained purely by virtue of the form of the representations. There can be no appeal to what the representations 'mean'. His argument is that the buck has to stop somewhere: if one is to characterize the brain as a computational device, driven by :he syntax of internal representations, an appeal to 'meaning in the outside world' amounts to an invocation of magic.
So far Fodor's story is altogether compatible with Conceptual Semantics. But now it splits in two directions. On one hand, Fodor argues 1980 for 'methodological solipsism'-the idea that the only causal determinants of behavior (including inference) are the formal properties of internal representations. This is again consistent with Conceptual Semantics, in which rules of inference do not reach out from conceptual structures to the 'world' but are rather confined to examining conceptual structures themselves.
However, another thread in Fodor's work (seen especially in Fodor 1987) is his insistence on Intentional Realism, the idea that the mental representations over which these computations take place still do nonetheless have further semantic content-that they are representations of propositions with real-world reference and truth-value. This view allegedly makes contact with Chomsky's notion of Universal Grammar in the following way:
It is, however, important to the Neocartesian [i. [Fodor's italics] . (Fodor 1983, pp.4-5) But let us look at the representations of, say, generative phonology. It makes little sense to think of the rules of phonology as propositional; for instance it is strange to say that English speakers know the proposition, true in the world independent of speakers of English, that in English syllableinitial voiceless consonants aspirate before stress. This amounts to an appeal to the properties of E-language. In generative phonology as it is conducted by its practitioners, the rule of aspiration is regarded as a principle of internal computation, not a fact about the world. 'Such semantical concepts as implication, confirmation, and logical consequence' seem curiously irrelevant. In short, the notion of computation need not have anything to do with 'respecting semantic relations', at least in the domains of phonology and syntax.
If one has hesitations about this argument with respect to phonology, we may also consider a slightly more exotic cognitive domain, the understanding of music. As shown in Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983 , the factors that make a piece of music cohere for a listener into something beyond a mere sequence of notes involve complex internal computations over abstract mental representations of the piece. Fodor's insistence on respecting semantic relations seems totally out of place here: these abstract structures are part of mental life, but one would hardly want to make a metaphysical claim about there being something 'real' in the world, propositional or otherwise, which they are representations of. The question at issue, then, is whether conceptual structure is somehow different from phonology, syntax, and music-whether, when we enter the domain of meaning, the rules of the game should be changed, so that propositional content rather than computational form ought to be the focus of inquiry. Fodor's position, as I understand it, is that the generalizations (or laws) of psychology are intentional (that is, concern the propositional content of representations, outside the head), but that the mental mechanisms that instantiate these generalizations are merely formal computations that have no access to propositional content. For Fodor, the fact that these mental computations preserve semantic properties comes from the fact that the formal structures mimic the structure of the (non-mental) content in considerable detail. In fact, Fodor argues for the combinatorial character of mental representations precisely on the grounds that they must mimic what he takes to be the undeniable combinatoriality of propositional content. Put in present terms, his position is that we grasp the world the
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77 way we do precisely because that is the way the world is. (This argument is perhaps clearest in the Appendix to Fodor 1987.) What Fodor appears to require, then, is a marriage between the Realism of truth-conditional semantics and the mentalism of generative grammar-that is, a unified theory of E-semantics and I-semantics, mediated by the relation of intentionality, which even to Fodor is mysterious.2
Conceptual semantics, on the other hand, is concerned most directly with the form of the internal mental representations that constitute conceptual structure and with the formal relations between this level and other levels of representation. The theory of conceptual structure is thus taken to be entirely parallel to the theory of syntactic or phonological structure. The computation of inference, like for instance the computation of rhyme in phonology, is a matter internal to the organism.
For Fodor, as for the model theorists, such an inquiry does not count as semantics: he requires a theory of semantics to include a Realist account of truth-conditions and inference. Once again, I don't care too much about terminology. I would prefer that the enterprise be judged on its merits rather than being summarily dismissed because it doesn't address issues that someone calls the True Issues of Semantics. If one would rather call the enterprise logical or conceptual syntax, or the 'Syntax of Thought' Hypothesis, that's fine with me. We should be clear, though, that it is in principle as different from 'straight' syntax (the grammar of NPs, VPs, etc.) a s straight syntax is from phonology.
Given the meager positive empirical results of Fodor's approach, which has been largely devoted to showing what else won't work, I submit that the merits of the Language of Thought Hypothesis over the Syntax of Thought Hypothesis have yet to be demonstrated.
How do the two approaches differ empirically? The difference is that Fodor insists that all combinatorial properties of I-concepts must be mirrored in Reality, while a theory of pure I-semantics is not necessarily subject to that constraint. As will be shown below, there are many structural properties of Conceptual Semantics that make little sense as properties of Reality, but a great deal of sense as properties of mind. I will therefore conclude that Fodor's insistence on Intentional Realism is misguided for the purpose of doing scientific psychology.
(Note that this conclusion is not inconsistent with Fodor's observation, seconded by Dennett 1987 , that Intentional Realism is an extremely useful stance for dealing with people in ordinary life. But 'folk physics' is a good stance for ordinary life, too. That does not make it a productive constraint for doing scientific physics. So why get mired in 'folk psychology' when studying the mind?)
To conclude this section, I should mention the relation of Conceptual
My interpretation here is confirmed by Dennett's (1987, p.288) revealing remarks on
Fodor.
Semantics to a program of research called Cognitive Grammar or Cognitive Semantics (e.g. Fauconnier 1984; Langacker 1986; Herskovits 1986; Lakoff 1987) . This work, like Conceptual Semantics, is concerned with the mental representation of the world and its relation to language. It shares with Conceptual Semantics a concern with the encoding of spatial concepts and their extension to other conceptual fields (see section 6). Some work in this tradition, especially that of Talmy (1980 Talmy ( , 1983 Talmy ( , 1988 , has provided important insights and analyses to the present framework. Conceptual Semantics differs from Cognitive Grammar, however, in that (1) it is committed to an autonomous level of syntactic representation rather than its abandonment; (2) it is committed to rigorous formalism, insofar as possible, on the grounds that formal treatment is the best way of rendering a theory testable; (3) it makes contact with relevant results in perceptual psychology rather than leaving such relationships tacit; (4) i t is committed to exploring issues of learnability and hence to the possibility of a strong innate formal basis for concept acquisition.
Organization of Language
Next I must spend a little time sketching the relation of the putative level of conceptual structure to language. For concreteness, I will assume an overall organization of the mental information structure involved in language as diagrammed in (1).
formation formation This organization includes three autonomous levels of structure: phonological, syntactic, and conceptual. Each of these has its own characteristic primitives and principles of combination and its own organization into subcomponents, such as segmental phonology, intonation contour, and metrical grid in phonology, and D-structure, S-structure, Phonetic Form
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79 (PF), and Logical Form (LF) (or counterparts in other theories) in syntax. Each of the levels is described by a set of formafion rules that generates the well-formed structures of the level. The grammar also contains sets of correspondence rules that link the levels. The correspondence of phonological structure to syntactic structure is specified by one such set. This is, for instance, the locus of 'readjustment rules' such as cliticization. The correspondence of syntactic and conceptual structures is specified by what used to be called 'projection rules' (Katz and Fodor 1963) , which determine the relation of syntactic structure to meaning.
Figure (1) also includes correspondence rules between the linguistic levels and nonlinguistic domains. On one end, there must be a mapping from the acoustic analysis provided by the auditory system into phonological structure; this mapping is the subject matter of acoustic phonetics. There must also be a mapping from phonological structure into motor commands to the vocal tract, the domain of articulatory phonetics. On the other end, there must be mappings between conceptual structure and other forms of mental representation that encode, for instance, the output of the visual faculty and the input to the formulation of action. One such representation will be mentioned briefly in section 7.
Since conceptual structure is the domain of mental representation over which inference can be defined, figure (1) also includes a component called 'rules of inference', which maps conceptual structures into conceptual structures. As argued in Jackendoff 1983, chapters 5 and 6, I include in this component not only rules of logical inference but also rules of invited inference, pragmatics, and heuristics: whatever differences there may be among these categories of principles, they are all defined over the same level of mental representation. That is, there is no proprietary level of 'semantic representation' at which only logical properties of sentences are encoded, with other 'pragmatic' properties reserved for a different level.
It should be pointed out that, under the view being laid out here, the level of conceptual structure is not completely language-dependent, since it serves as an interface between linguistic information and information germane to other capacities such as vision and action. I assume, on grounds of evolutionary conservatism, that nonlinguistic organisms-both higher animals and babies-also possess a level of conceptual structure in their mental repertoire, perhaps not as rich as ours, but formally similar in many respects. The difference between us and the beasts is that we have evolved a capacity to process syntactic and phonological structures, as well as the mappings from them to conceptual structure and to the auditory and motor peripheries. These mappings are what permit us a relatively overt realization of conceptual structure-language-that is unavailable to other organisms.
Figure (1) as it stands contains no explicit lexical component. Where is the lexicon in this picture? Under the standard view of the lexicon, a lexical item establishes a correspondence between well-formed fragments of phonological, syntactic, and conceptual structure; that is, the lexicon is a part of the correspondence rule component. Thus we can regard each component in figure (1) as divided into lexical principles (those that apply within words) and supralexical principles (those that apply to domains larger than the word level). However, the basic alphabet of primitives and principles of combination is shared by the two subcomponents. For instance, Selkirk 1982 has argued that the syntactic part of morphology, or word formation, consists essentially of an extension of the principles of syntax down below the word level. Similarly, in phonology, the lexical and supralexical principles of stress assignment, though different in details, deal in exactly the same kinds of formal entities.
In parallel fashion, we can ask about the relation between the grammar of sentential concepts and the grammar of lexical concepts, both of which are subsumed under the rubric 'conceptual formation rules' in figure (1). Gruber 1965 , Jackendoff 1983 , and indeed the generative semanticists (McCawley 1968; Postal 1970; Lakoff 1971) argue that the semantic combinations that can be expressed through syntactic phrases can in many cases also be incorporated into lexical conceptual structures. For instance, to the extent that two times paraphrases twice, or cause to die paraphrases kill, or break violently paraphrases smash, or give away in exchange for money paraphrases sell, the supralexical conceptual structures expressed by the paraphrases must be reproduced internal to unitary lexical items3 That is, the grammars of sentential concepts and of lexical concepts interpenetrate in much the same way as do the grammars of, say sentential and lexical stress: they share many of the same primitives and principles of combination, even if they differ in details. In short, the division of the overall grammar into three independent levels linked by correspondence rules is crosscut by a subsidiary division in each component into lexical versus supralexical principles.
Feature-Based Aspects of Conceptual Structure
Section 3 argued that the central issue of a theory of I-conceptual knowledge ought to be the innate units and principles of organization that underlie human lexical and sentential concepts. I have now presented enough background to be able to sketch out three major subsystems within conceptual structure. The first involves the major category system and Generative Semantics used this observation as motivation for assimilating semantics to syntactic principles. The central program of the theory was to reduce d l semantic compositionality to syntax. As more and more was discovered about semantic structure, it became clear that this program was not feasible. For at least some Generative Semanticists, the conclusion was that syntax should be abandoned altogether. As seen in figure (l), the approach here is to retain syntax for its proper traditional purposes, but to invest semantic expressivity in a different component with appropriate expressive power: conceptual structure. 81 argument structure; the second involves the organization of semantic fields; the third involves the conceptualization of boundedness and aggregation.
Ontological Categories and Argument Structure
Jackendoff 1983, chapters 3 and 4, proposes a basic organization of major conceptual categories. Instead of a division of formal entities into such familiar logical types as constants, variables, predicates, and quantifiers, each of which has nothing in common with the others, it is argued that the major units of conceptual structure are conceptual constituents, each of which belongs to one of a small set of major ontological categories (or conceptual 'parts of speech') such as Thing, Event, State, Place, Path, Property, and Amount. These are obviously all quite different in the kind of reference they pick out, but formally (algebraically) they have a great deal in common. Here are six points of similarity.
(a) Each major syntactic constituent of a sentence (excluding contentless constituents such as epenthetic it and there) corresponds to a conceptual constituent in the meaning of the sentence. For example, in John ran toward the house, the NPs John and the house correspond to Thing-constituents, the PP toward the house corresponds to a Path-constituent, and the entire sentence corresponds to an Event-constituent.
Note that this correspondence is stated very carefully. As will be seen presently, the converse mapping does not hold. That is, not every conceptual constituent in the meaning of a sentence corresponds to a syntactic constituent, because (for one thing) many conceptual constituents of a sentence's meaning are completely contained within lexical items. In addition, note that the matching is by constituents, not by categories, because the mapping between conceptual and syntactic categories is many- (b) Each conceptual category supports the encoding of units not only on the basis of linguistic input, but also on the basis of the visual (or other sensory) environment. For example, (2a) points out a Thing in the environment; (2b) points out a Place; (2c) accompanies the demonstration of an Action; (2d) accompanies the demonstration of a Distance, independent of the object whose length it is.
( 2 ) a. That is a robin.
b These observations, though slightly tedious, should convey the general picture: though none of the major conceptual categories can be insightfully reduced to the others, they share important formal properties. Thus a basic formation rule for conceptual categories can be stated along the lines in (8).
Event/Thing/Place/ . . . (8) decomposes each conceptual constituent into three basic feature complexes, one of which, the argument structure feature, allows for recursion of conceptual structure and hence an infinite class of possible concepts.
In addition, observation (a) above-the fact that major syntactic phrases correspond to major conceptual constituents-can be formalized as a general correspondence rule of the form (9); and observation (f)-the basic correspondence of syntactic and conceptual argument structure-can be formalized as a general correspondence rule of the form (10). (XI' stands for any major syntactic constituent; X" stands for any lexical item that occurs with (optional) complements YP and ZP.) The examples in (a)-(f) above show that the syntactic category and the value of the conceptual n-ary feature Thing/Event/Place . . . are irrelevant to the general form of these rules. The algebra of conceptual structure and its relation to syntax are best stated cross-categorially.
Organization of Semantic Fields
A second cross-categorial property of conceptual structure forms a central concern of the 'localistic' theory of Gruber 1965 and others. The basic insight of this theory is that the formalism for encoding concepts of spatial location and motion, suitably abstracted, can be generalized to many other semantic fields. The standard evidence for this claim is the fact that many verbs and prepositions appear in two or more semantic fields, forming intuitively related paradigms. (11) illustrates some basic cases. ii. The light is red.
iii. Sam kept the crowd happy.
Harry went from elated to depressed.
Harry is depressed. Each of these sets contains a verb go or change (connected with the prepositions from and/or to), the verb be, and the verb keep. The go sentences each express a change of some sort, and their respective terminal states are described by the corresponding be sentences. The keep sentences all denote the causation of a state that endures over a period of time. One has the sense, then, that this variety of uses is not accidental.
On the other hand, the generalization of lexical items across semantic fields is by no means totally free. Each word is quite particular about what fields it appears in. For instance, go cannot be substituted for change in (lld), and change cannot be substituted for go in (lla). Travel occurs as a verb of change only in the spatial field; donate only in possessional; become only in ascriptional; and schedule only in scheduling.
Gruber's Thematic Relations Hypothesis, as adapted in Jackendoff (1972 Jackendoff ( , 1976 Jackendoff ( , 1983 lo), accounts for the paradigms in (11) by claiming that they are each realizations of the basic conceptual paradigm given in (12). (The ontological category variable is notated as a subscript on the brackets; nothing except convenience hangs on this notational choice as opposed to that in (8) .)
The paradigms are distinguished from one another by a semantic field feature that designates the field in which the Event or State is defined. In the works cited above, the field feature is notated as a subscript on the function: GOSpatlal (or, more often, plain GO) vs. GOPossvs. GOldrnt (using Gruber's term Identificational) vs. GO,,,,.
Again, not much hangs on this particular notation. The point is that at this grain of analysis the four semantic fields have parallel conceptual structure. They differ only in what counts as an entity being in a Place. In the spatial field, a Thing is located spatially; in possessional, a Thing belongs to someone; in ascriptional, a Thing has a property; in scheduling, an Event is located in a time period.
This notation captures the lexical parallelisms in (11) Recall that in each paradigm in (ll), the be sentence expresses the endstate of the go sentence. This can be captured in the informally stated inference rule (13), which is independent of semantic field.
(13)

At the termination of [Euen, GO ([XI, [Path TO ([Y])])],
A variety of such inference rules appear, in slightly different formalism, in Jackendoff 1976. In particular, it is shown that many so-called 'implicative' properties of verbs follow from generalized forms of inference rules developed to account for verbs of spatial motion and location. Thus inferential properties such as 'factive', 'implicative', and 'semi-factive' need not be stated as arbitrary meaning postulates. This is exactly the sort of explanatory power one wants from a theory of lexical decomposition into conceptual features.
Each semantic field has its own particular inference patterns as well. For instance, in the spatial field, one fundamental principle stipulates that an object cannot be in two disjoint places at once. From this principle plus rule (13), it follows that an object that travels from one place to another is not still in its original position. But in the field of information transfer, this inference does not hold. If Bill transfers information to Harry, by (13) we can infer that Harry ends up having the information. But since information, unlike objects, can be in more than one place at a time, Bill still may have the information too. Hence rule (13) generalizes from the spatial field to information transfer, but the principle of exclusive location does not. Thus inference rules as well as lexical entries benefit from a featural decomposition of concepts: the Thematic Relations Hypothesis and the use of the semantic field feature permit us to generalize just those aspects that are general, while retaining necessary distinction^.^ Notice how this treatment of the paradigms in (11) addresses the issues of learnability discussed in section 3. The claim is that the different concepts expressed by keep, for example, are not unrelated: they share the same functional structure and differ only in the semantic field variable. This being the case, it is easier for a child learning English to extend keep to a new field than to learn an entirely new word. In addition, the words that cross fields can serve as scaffolding upon which a child can organize new semantic fields of abstract character (for instance scheduling), in turn providing a framework for learning the words in that field that are peculiar See SbC, sections 10.3-5 for further discussion of the Thematic Relations Hypothesis, in particular how it is different from a theory of 'metaphor' a la Lakoff and Johnson 1980 , and why it is justification for the approach of Conceptual Semantics as opposed to model-theoretic @-)semantics. These sections also implicitly answer Dowty's 1988 charge that the 'metaphorical extension' of thematic relations to nonspatial fields is incoherent; basically, Dowty is looking for an explication of thematic relations based on E-semantics, and the generalization of thematic relations probably only makes sense in terms of I-semantics. 87 to it. Thus the Thematic Relations Hypothesis, motivated by numerous paradigms like (11) in English and many other languages, forms an important component of a mentalistic theory of concepts and how humans can grasp them.
Aggregation and Boundedness
The phenomena discussed so far in this section involve areas where the syntactic category system and the conceptual category system match up fairly well. In a way, the relation between the two systems serves as a partial explication of the categorial and functional properties of syntax: syntax presumably evolved as a means to express conceptual structure, so it is natural to expect that some of the structural properties of concepts would be mirrored in the organization of syntax.
On the other hand, there are other aspects of conceptual structure that display a strong featural character but which are not expressed in so regular a fashion in syntax (at least in English). One such aspect (discussed in Vendler 1967; Verkuyl 1972; Mourelatos 1981; Talmy 1978; Platzack 1979; Declerck 1979; Dowty 1979; Hinrichs 1985; and Bach 1986b, among The question raised by these examples is why prefixing for hours or until noon should have such effects: sometimes it leaves a sentence acceptable, sometimes it renders it ungrammatical, and sometimes it adds a sense of repetition. The essential insight is that for hours places a measure on an otherwise temporally unbounded process, and that until noon places a temporal boundary on an otherwise temporally unbounded process. Bill slept, for instance, inherently expresses an unbounded process, so it can be felicitously prefixed with these expressions. On the other hand, Bill ate the hot dog expresses a temporally bounded event, so it cannot be further measured or bounded.
In turn, there are two ways in which a sentence can be interpreted as a temporally unbounded process. One is for the sentence to inherently express a temporally unbounded process, as is the case in (14a, c, e, g, i, k, 1, n). We will return to these cases shortly. The other is for the sentence to be interpreted as an indefinite repetition of an inherently bounded process, as in (14b, h, j, m). (Biz1 ate the hot dog, like Bill died, is bounded but unrepeatable, so it cannot be interpreted in this fashion.) This sense of repetition has no syntactic reflex in English, though some languages such as Hungarian and Finnish have an iterative aspect that does express it.
How should this sense of iteration be encoded in conceptual structure? It would appear most natural to conceive of it as an operator that maps a single Event into a repeated sequence of individual Events of the same type. Brief consideration suggests that in fact this operator has exactly the same semantic value as the plural marker, which maps individual Things into collections of Things of the same type. That is, this operator is not formulated specifically in terms of Events, but should be applicable in cross-categorial fashion to any conceptual entity that admits of individuation. The fact that this operator does not receive consistent expression across syntactic categories should not obscure the essential semantic generalization.
Returning to the inherently unbounded cases, it has often been observed that the bounded/unbounded (event/process, telidatelic) distinction is strongly parallel to the count/mass distinction in NPs. An important criterion for the count/mass distinction has to do with the description of parts of an entity. For instance, a part of an apple (count) cannot itself be described as an apple; but any part of a body of water (mass) can itself be described as water (unless the part gets too small with respect to its molecular structure). This same criterion applies to the event/process distinction: a part of John ate the sandwich (event) cannot itself be described as John ate the sandwich. By contrast, any part of John ran toward the house (process) can itself be described as John ran toward the house (unless the part gets smaller than a single stride). These similarities suggest that conceptual structure should encode this distinction cross-categorially too, so that the relevant inference rules do not care whether they are dealing with Things vs. Substances or Events vs. Processes.
It has also been often observed that plurals behave in many respects like mass nouns, and that repeated events behave like processes. (Talmy 1978 suggests the term 'medium' to encompass them both.) The difference is only that plural nouns and repeated events fix the 'grain size' in terms of the singular individuals making up the unbounded medium, so that decomposition of the medium into parts is not as arbitrary as it is with substances and processes. Thus the structure of the desired feature system is organized a s in (15). (14) provide evidence that Paths also participate in the system shown in (15). For instance, to t h f house is a bounded Path; no parts of it except those including the terminus can be described as to the house. By contrast, toward the house and down the road are unbounded Paths, any part of which can also be described as toward the house or down the road. Into houses describes multiple bounded Paths, one per house.
Thus the cross-categorial feature system in (15) extends to yet another major ontological category.
Here is an example that illustrates some of the explanatory power achieved through the system of features in (15): the meaning of the word end. For a first approximation, an end is a zero-dimensional boundary of an entity conceived of as 1-dimensional. So, for the simplest case, the end of a line is a point. A beam is conceived of (as in Marr 1982) as a long axis elaborated by a cross-section. The end of a beam is a point bounding the long axis, elaborated by the same cross-section; this makes it 2-dimensional. A table can be said to have an end just in case it can be seen as having a long axis (e.g. it is rectangular or oval but not square or circular); the end is then just the boundary of the long axis elaborated by the short axis. However, in the expected cross-categorial fashion, we can speak of the end of a week (a point bounding a 1-dimensional period of time) and the end of a talk (a zero-dimensional State bounding an Event that extends over time).
However, there is an apparent difficulty in this account of end. If the end of a talk is a point in time, how can one felicitously say, 'I am now giving the end of my talk', or 'I am now finishing my talk'? The progressive aspect in these sentences implies the existence of a process taking place over time, and therefore seems to attribute a temporal extent to the end.
The answer is provided by looking at the treatment of the boundaries of Things. Consider what is meant by Bill cut off the end of tke ribbon. Bill cannot have cut off just the geometrical boundary of the ribbon. Rather, the sense of this sentence shows that the notion of end permits an optional elaboration: the end may consist of a part of the object it bounds, extending from the actual boundary into the object some small distance E.
There are other boundary words that obligatorily include this sort of elaboration. For instance, a crust is a 2-dimensional boundary of a 3-dimensional volume, elaborated by extending it some distance E into the volume. Border carries a stronger implication of such elaboration than does edge: consider that the border of the rug is liable to include a pattern in the body of the rug, while the edge of tke rug is more liable to include only the binding.
The claim, then, is that end includes such an elaboration as an optional part of its meaning. Going back to the case of Events, I can therefore felicitously say 'I am giving the end of my talk' or 'I am finishing my talk' if I am within the region that extends backward the permissible distance E from the actual cessation of speech. In other words, the featural machinery of dimensionality and boundaries, with which we characterize Things and the regions of space they occupy, extends over to Events as well. That's why the word end is so natural in either context. The main difference in the systems is that Things have a maximum dimensionality of 3, while Events have a maximum dimensionality of only 1, so that certain distinctions in the Thing system are leveled out or unavailable in the Event system. Only in a theory of conceptual structure that permits this sort of cross-categorial generalization can even the existence of a word like end be explained, much less the peculiarities of its use in so many different contexts-and the fact that these peculiarities are evidently learnable. (This subsystem of conceptual structure will be treated in detail in Jackendoff in preparation.) A general conclusion emerges from these three brief case studies. Beneath the surface complexity of natural language concepts lies a highly abstract formal algebraic system that lays out the major parameters of thought. The distinctions in this system are quite sharp and do not appear to be based on experience. Rather, I would claim, they are the machinery available to the human mind to channel the ways in which all experience can be mentally encoded-elements of the Universal Grammar for conceptual structure.
Significantly, the primitives of this system cannot appear in isolation. Rather, they are like phonological features or the quarks of particle physics: they can only be observed in combination, built up into conceptual constituents, and their existence must be inferred from their effects on langu-age and cognition as a whole. This result militates against Fodor's Intentional Realism, in that one should not expect constant counterparts in reality for every aspect of the conceptual system. Roughly speaking, concepthood is a property of conceptual constituents, not conceptual features.
Where Traditional Features Fail
One of the abiding reasons for skepticism about feature-based semantics, even among those who believe in semantic decomposition, is that simple categorical features are clearly inadequate to the full task of conceptual description. These suspicions have been voiced since the earliest days of semantics in generative grammar (Bolinger 1965; Weinreich 1966 ) and continue to the present day (e.g. Lakoff 1987) . This section will briefly mention three of the problems and the forms of enrichment proposed within Conceptual Semantics to deal with them.
Spatial Structure of Objects
The first problem has to do with specifying the shapes of objects. For instance, consider the lexical entries for duck and goose. Both of these presumably carry features to the effect that they are animate, nonhuman categories of Things, that they are types of birds, perhaps types of waterfowl. But what comes next?-how are they distinguished from one another? One possible factor, which clearly enters into learning the words in the first place, is how ducks and geese look, and how they differ in appearance, But to encode this difference in binary features, say [+-long neck], is patently ridiculous. Similarly, how is a chair to be distinguished from a stool? Do they differ in a feature [?has-a-back]? What sort of feature is this? It is surely not a primitive. But, if composite, how far down does one have to go to reach primitives-if one can at all? To put a ? sign and a pair of brackets around any old expression simply doesn't make it into a legitimate conceptual feature.
This problem is addressed in Jackendoff 1987 chapter 10, in the context of the connection between the linguistic and visual faculties. In order for an organism to accomplish visual identification and categorization, independent of language, there must be a form of visual representation that encodes geometric and topological properties of physical objects. The most plausible proposal I have encountered for such a representation is the 3 0 model structure of Marr 1982 . In turn, this structure can be interfaced with conceptual structure via a set of correspondence rules, as suggested in figure (1) above. This correspondence effects a translation of visual information into linguistic format, enabling us to talk about what we see.
Marr's approach is interesting because of the way it goes beyond a simple template theory of visual recognition. The 3D model is much more than a 'statue in the head'. It is an articulated structure that encodes the decomposition of objects into parts, the geometric systems of spatial axes around which objects are organized, and the relations among the parts. Within this framework, it is possible to represent not just single objects in single positions, but ranges of sizes, ranges of angles of attachment of parts, and ranges of detail from coarse-to fine-grained. Thus it is admirably suited to encoding just those geometric aspects of an object's appearance that are an embarrassment to any reasonable feature system. Jackendoff 1987 suggests, therefore, that the lexical entry for a physical object word includes a 3D model representation in addition to its phonological, syntactic, and conceptual structures. The 3D model in fact plays the role sometimes assigned to an 'image of a stereotypical instance', except that it is much more highly structured, along the lines suggested by Marr, and it includes parameters of variation among instances. The distinctions between duck and goose and between chair and stool, then, can appear in the 3D model instead of conceptual structure. We thereby eliminate the need for a plethora of objectionable conceptual features in favor of a geometric representation with entirely different primitives and principles of combination. It is shown that this natural division of labor is of benefit not only to the theory of the lexicon but also to the theory of visual categorization; I will not repeat the arguments here.
I should however add that the use of the 3D model need not pertain just to objects and the nouns that denote them. Marr and Vaina 1982 propose a natural extension of the 3D model to encode action patterns such as throwing and saluting. This can be used to address a parallel problem in the verbal system: how is one to distinguish, say, running from jogging from loping, or throwing from tossing from lobbing? If the lexical entries for these verbs contain a 3D model representation of the action in question, no distinction at all need be made in conceptual structure. The first set of verbs will all simply be treated in conceptual structure as verbs of locomotion, the second set as verbs of propulsion. Thus again we are relieved of the need for otiose feature analyses of such fine-scale distinctions.
Focal Values in a Continuous Domain
A second area in which a simple feature analysis fails concerns domains with a continuous rather than a discrete range of values. Consider the domain expressed by temperature words (hot, warm, tepid, c o d , cold, etc.) or the domain of color words. One cannot decompose hot or red exhaustively into discrete features that distinguish them from cold and yellow respectively. The proper analysis seems to be that these words have a semantic field feature (Temperature or Color) that picks out a 'cognitive space' consisting of a continuous range of values. In the case of Temperature, the space is essentially linear; in the case of Color, it is the familiar three-dimensional color solid (Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976) . For a first approximation, each temperature or color word picks out a point in its space, which serves as a focal value for the word.
According to this analysis, a percept is categorized in terms of its relative distance from available focal values. So, for example, a percept whose value in color space is close to focal red is easily categorized as red; a percept whose value lies midway between focal red and focal orange is categorized with less certainty and with more contextual dependence. Thus color categorization is a result of the interaction between the intrinsic structure of the color space-including physiologically determined salient valuesand the number and position of color values for which the language has words (Berlin and Kay 1969) .
Refinements can be imagined in the structure of such spaces. For example, the field of temperature has both positive and negative directions, so one can ask either how hot? or how cold? By contrast, the field of size words has only a positive direction from the zero point, so that how big? asks a neutral question about size but hozu small? is intended in relation to some contextually understood small standard. I will not pursue such refinements here. The point is that the introduction of continuous 'cognitive spaces' in which words pick out focal values is an important enrichment of the expressive power of conceptual structure beyond simple categorical feature systems.
Preference Rule Systems
A different challenge to feature systems arises in the treatment of so-called 'cluster concepts'. Consider the following examples. Climbing appears to involve two independent conceptual conditions: (1) an individual is traveling upward; and (2) the individual is moving with characteristic effortful grasping motions, for which a convenient term is clambering. On the most likely interpretation of (16a), both these conditions are met. However, (16b) violates the first condition, and, since snakes can't clamber, (16c) violates the second. If both conditions are violated, as in (16d), the action cannot at all be characterized as climbing. Thus neither of the two conditions is necessary, but either is sufficient. However, the meaning of the word climb is not just the disjunction of these two conditions. That would be in effect equivalent to saying that there are two unrelated senses of the word, one having to d o with going up, and one having to do with clambering. If this were the correct analysis, we would have the intuition that (16a) is as ambiguous as Bill went down to the bank, which may refer equally to a river bank or a savings bank. But in fact we do not. Rather, (16a), which satisfies both conditions at once, is more 'stereotypical' climbing. Actions that satisfy only one of the conditions, such as (16b, c), are somewhat more marginal but still perfectly legitimate instances of climbing. In other words, the two conditions combine in the meaning of a single lexical item climb, but not according to a standard Boolean conjunction or disjunction. Jackendoff 1983, chapter 8, calls a set of conditions combined in this way a preference rule system, and the conditions in the set preference rules or preference conditions.6
A similar paradigm can be displayed for the verb see.
(17) a. Bill saw Harry. b. Bill saw a vision of dancing devils. c. Bill saw the tree, but he didn't notice it at the time. d. *Bill saw a vision of dancing devils, but he didn't notice it at the time.
The two preference conditions for x sees y are roughly that (1) x's gaze makes contact with y, and (2) x has a visual experience of y. Stereotypical seeing, i.e. veridical seeing, satisfies both these conditions: x makes visual contact with some object and thereby has a visual experience of it. (17b) violates condition (1) and (17c) violates condition (2), yet both felicitously use the word see. But if both are violated at once, as in (17d), the sentence is extremely odd. Again, we don't want to say that there are two homonymous verbs see and hence that (17a) is ambiguous. The solution is to claim that these two conditions form a preference rule system, in which stereotypical seeing satisfies both conditions and less central cases satisfy only one-but either one.' Similar phenomena arise in the lexical entries for nouns that denote functional categories: form and function often are combined in a preference rule system. For instance, a stereotypical chair has a stereotypical form (specified by a 3D model) and a standard function (roughly 'portable thing for one person to sit on'). Objects with the proper function but the wrong form-say beanbag chairs-are more marginal instances of the category; and so are objects that have the right form but which cannot fulfill the function-say chairs made of newspaper or giant chairs. An object that violates both conditions, say a pile of crumpled newspaper, is by no stretch of imagination a chair. This is precisely the behavior we saw in climb and see.
A further aspect of preference rule systems is that when one lacks information about the satisfaction of the condition, they are invariably assumed to be satisfied as default values. Thus, the reason (16a) and (17a) are interpreted as stereotypical climbing and seeing is that the sentences This analysis of climb was to my knowledge first proposed by Fillmore 1982; a formal treatment in terms of preference rules appears in Jackendoff 1985 . 'This analysis of see is adapted from Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976 and appears in more detail in Jackendoff 1983, chapter 8. give no information to the contrary. It is only in the b. and c. sentences, which do give information to the contrary, that a condition is relinquished. The examples of preference rule systems given here have all involved only a pair of conditions. Systems with a larger number of conditions are likely to exist, but are harder to ferret out and articulate without detailed analysis. A preference rule system with only one condition degenerates to a standard default value. More generally, preference rule systems are capable of accounting for 'family resemblance' categories such as Wittgenstein's 1958 well-known example game, for Rosch's 1978 'prototypes', and for other cases in which systems of necessary and sufficient conditions have failed because all putative conditions have counterexamples (but not all at once).
Still more broadly, Jackendoff 1983 shows that preference rule systems are an appropriate formalism for a vast range of psychological phenomena, from low-level visual and phonetic perception to high-level operations such as conscious decision-making. The formalism was in fact developed originally to deal with phenomena of musical cognition (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983) and was anticipated by the gestalt psychologists in their study of visual perception (Wertheimer 1923) . There seems every reason, then, to believe that preference rule systems are a pervasive element of mental computation; we should therefore have no hesitation in adopting them as a legitimate element in a theory of I-concepts. (See Jackendoff 1983 chapters 7 and 8, for extended discussion of preference rule systems, including comparison with systems of necessary and sufficient conditions, prototype theory, and fuzzy set theory.)
To sum up, this section has suggested three ways in which the decomposition of lexical concepts goes beyond simple categorical feature oppositions. These mechanisms conspire to make word meanings far richer than classical categories. Each of them creates a continuum between stereotypical and marginal instances, and each can create fuzziness or vagueness at category boundaries. Moreover, each of them can be motivated on more general cognitive grounds, so we are not multiplying artifices just to save the theory of lexical decomposition. And indeed, they appear collectively to go a long way toward making a suitably expressive theory of word meaning attainable.
Lexical Composition versus Meaning Postulates
Section 3 argued from the creativity of lexical concept formation to the position that lexical conceptual structures must be compositional, and that one has an innate 'universal grammar of concepts' that enables one to construct new lexical concepts as needed. An important aspect of Fodor's work on the Language of Thought Hypothesis has been to deny lexical compositionality. Not that Fodor has offered any alternative analysis of lexical concepts that deals with any of the problems discussed in the last two sections; indeed his arguments are almost exclusively negative. Nevertheless, for completeness I had better address his concerns.
Fodor's first set of arguments (Fodor 1970; Fodor, Garrett, Walker, and Parkes 1980) builds on the virtual impossibility of giving precise definitions for most words. If definitions are impossible, Fodor argues, there is no reason to believe that words have internal structure. But in fact, all this observation shows is that if there are principles of lexical conceptual composition, they are not entirely identical with the principles of phrasal conceptual composition. If the principles are not identical, it will often be impossible to build up an expression of conceptual structure phrasally that completely duplicates a lexical concept. In particular, it appears that the nondiscrete elements discussed in section 7 play a role only in lexical semantics and never appear as a result of phrasal combination. Hence phrasal expansions of these aspects of lexical meaning cannot be constructed. Yet they are indubitably compositional. So this argument of Fodor's does not go through; it is founded on a false assumption of complete uniformity of lexical and phrasal composition.
The second set of arguments concerns processing. Fodor's supposition is that if lexical concepts are composite, a more complex word ought to induce a greater processing load and/or take more time to access or process than a less complex word. Finding no experimental evidence for such effects (Fodor, Fodor and Garrett 1975) , Fodor concludes again that lexical items cannot have compositional structure.* I see no reason to accept the premise of this argument. As is well known, the acquisition of motor concepts (such as playing a scale on the piano) speeds u p performance over sequential performance of the constituent parts. Nevertheless, such motor concepts must still be compositional, since in the end the same complex motor patterns must be evoked. It stands to reason, then, that acquisition of a lexical concept might also speed up processing over a syntactically complex paraphrase, without in any way reducing conceptual complexity: a lexical item is 'chunked', whereas a phrasal equivalent is not.
Because Fodor can find no system of lexical composition that satisfies his criteria of intentionality and of decomposition into necessary and sufficient conditions (both of which are abandoned in Conceptual Semantics), he decides that the enterprise is impossible, and that lexical concepts must in fact be indissoluble monads. He recognizes two difficulties in this position having to do with inference and acquisition, and he offers answers. Let me take these up in turn.
The first issue is how inference can be driven by lexical concepts with no internal structure. If one is dealing with inferences such as ( The trouble with such an approach, even if it can succeed observationally, is that it denies the possibility of generalizing among the inferential properties of different lexical items. Each item is a world unto itself. Thus, for instance, consider the entailment relationship between the members of causative-noncausative pairs such as those in (18). (18) (1) is mentioned in the analysis (here, the lexical meaning postulates) of many lexical items and (2) gives access to more general-purpose rules of inference. I suggest that, for fans of meaning postulates, lexical decomposition can be regarded systematically in this light: each element in a lexical decomposition can be regarded as that item's access to more generalpurpose rules of inference. The problem of lexical decomposition, then, is to find a vocabulary for decomposition that permits the linguistically significant generalizations of inference patterns to be captured formally in terms of schemas like (19) and rule (13) I conclude therefore that a meaning postulate approach to inference either misses all generalizations across inferential properties of lexical items or else is essentially equivalent to a decomposition theory. Thus Fodor has correctly identified a problem for his approach but has proposed a nonsolution.
The second difficulty Fodor sees for noncompositional lexical concepts is how one could possibly acquire them. In any computational theory, 'learning' can consist only of creating novel combinations of primitives already innately available. This is one of the fundamental arguments of Fodor 1975 , and one that I accept unconditionally. However, since for Fodor all lexical concepts are primitive, they cannot be learned as combinations of primitive vocabulary. It follows that all lexical concepts must be innate, including such exotica as telephone, spumoni, funicular, and soffit, a conclusion that strains credulity but which Fodor evidently embraces.
Notice how Fodor's position is different from saying that all lexical concepts must be within the innate expressive power of the grammar of conceptual structure, as advocated here. The difference is that in the present approach it is the potential of an infinite number of lexical concepts that is inherent in the grammar of conceptual structure-just as the potential for the syntactic structures of all human languages is inherent in Universal Grammar; lexical acquisition then requires constructing a particular lexical concept and associating it with a syntactic and phonological structure.
Fodor notes of course that not every speaker has a phonological realization of every lexical concept. Since his notion of 'realization' cannot include learning, he advocates that somehow the attachment of an innate lexical concept to a phonological structure is 'triggered' by relevant experience, perhaps by analogy with the way parameter settings in syntax are said to be triggered. However, the analogy is less than convincing. The setting of syntactic parameters is determined within a highly articulated theory of syntactic structure, where there is a limited number of choices for the setting. Fodor's proposed triggering of lexical concepts takes place in a domain where there is by hypothesis no relevant structure, and where the choices are grossly underdetermined. As far as I know, then, Fodor has offered no account of lexical concept realization other than a suggestive name. By contrast, real studies of language acquisition have benefited from decompositional theories of lexical concepts (e.g. Landau and Gleitman 1985; Pinker 1989) , so the decomposition theory has empirical results on its side in this area as well.
An especially unpleasant consequence of Fodor's position is that, given the finiteness of the brain, there can be only a finite number of possible lexical concepts. This seems highly implausible, since one can coin new names for arbitrary new types of objects and actions ('This is a glarf; now watch me snarf it'), and we have no sense that we will someday run out of names for things. More pointedly, the number of potential category concepts is at least as large as the number of concepts for individuals (tokens), since for every individual X one can form a category of 'things just like X' and give it a monomorphemic name. It is hard to believe that nature has equipped us with an ability to recognize individual things in the world that is limited to a finite number. So far as I know, Fodor has not addressed this objection. (See Jackendoff 1983 section 5.2, for a stronger version of this argument.)
From these considerations I conclude that Fodor's theory of lexical concepts cannot deal at all with the creativity of concept formation and with concept acquisition. Nor can any other theory that relies on monadic predicates linked by meaning postulates. By contrast, a compositional theory in principle offers solutions parallel to those for the creativity and acquisition of syntax.
Ending
So what is a concept? I have shown here that for the purpose of understanding the mind, the apposite focus of inquiry is the notion of I-concept, a species of mental information structure. The program of Conceptual Semantics provides a theoretical realization of this notion that unifies it in many ways with a mentalistic theory of the language faculty and with the theories of perception, cognition, and learning. In particular, I have identified the notion of I-concept with the formal notion of conceptual constifirent as developed in Conceptual Semantics. Furthermore, I have sketched a number of the major elements of the internal structure of concepts, showing how the approach accounts for various basic phenomena in the semantics of natural language, and how the approach meets various well-known objections to theories of lexical decomposition.
In evaluating this approach, I think two things must be borne in mind.
First, i t does not address what are taken to be some of the standard hurdles for a theory of concepts, for example Putnam's Twin Earth problem. What must be asked with respect to such problems, though, is whether they are relevant at all to a theory of I-concepts, or whether they are germane only to the theory of E-concepts, as I believe is the case with the Twin Earth problem. If they are problems only for E-conceptual theory, they play no role in evaluating the present approach.
Second, what I find appealing about the present approach is that it leads one into problems of richer and richer articulation: What are the ontological categories, and d o they themselves have internal structure? What sorts of fundamental functions are there that create Events, States, Places, and Paths? How are various semantic fields alike in structure, and how do they diverge? How do nondiscrete features interact with each other in phrasal combination? What are the conceptual primitives underlying social cognition and 'folk psychology'? How are conceptual systems learnable? And so forth. The fact that Conceptual Semantics begins to provide a formal vocabulary in which such questions can be couched suggests to
